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A MALTHUSIAN ANALYSIS OF THE SOCALLED DYNASTY TRUST
William J. Turnier*and Jeffery L. Harrison*
ABSTRACT
Select financial institutions and members of the Bar have seized
upon the presence of the limited exemption from the generationskipping transfer tax provided under the Internal Revenue Code to
promote so-called dynasty trusts as a means whereby individuals can
build dynastic wealth for a family forever free from transfer taxes. To
realize such benefits, state law that does not impose the Rule Against
Perpetuities must govern the trust. The promise of dynastic wealth is
unlikely to be realized due to several factors. Administrative and tax
costs are likely to reduce the yield on such trusts to a level where
inflation, rising expectations, and an ever growing band of beneficiaries
are typically assured to outpace the ability of the trust to deliver the
benefits anticipated by trust settlors. Whether required under current
standards of professional responsibility or not, an understanding of
these factors can elevate the quality of service provided by estate
planners.
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Under the Internal Revenue Code (Code), individuals are
allowed to place an amount of funds equal to the estate tax exemption
in a trust, and all distributions from that trust will be free of all
transfer taxes as long as the trust endures. This has led a number of
states to repeal the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) to accommodate
wealthy individuals who hope to establish trusts that will provide
support for their descendents well into the future. Providers of trust
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services have seized upon the opportunity to promote such trusts with
the promise of the accumulation of dynastic wealth for the eventual
benefit of the settlor's descendents. As part of a clever marketing
strategy, these trusts have been called "dynasty trusts" by their
promoters. It is the thesis of this article that the promoters promise
more than such trusts are able to deliver and that any individual
looking to a "dynasty trust" to provide dynastic wealth for
descendents had better look elsewhere.
At death, a widow, widower, or a single parent will typically want
to transfer most of his or her remaining wealth to any surviving
children. Married individuals typically transfer all wealth to the
surviving spouse or divide it between the surviving spouse and the
couple's children. At the death of the surviving spouse, that individual
will typically transfer all his or her remaining wealth to the children.
Under this paradigm, assuming the presence of sufficient wealth, there
will be an estate tax imposed on each generation as the children
follow the pattern established by the parents. As generation after
generation follows this typical pattern, tax authorities can expect to
collect a transfer tax as often as every twenty-five to thirty-five years.
Prior to the passage of the first generation-skipping transfer tax in
1976,1 it was common for wealthier families to transfer assets to
remote generations, thereby avoiding transfer taxes for several
generations. In well-planned estates of extremely wealthy individuals,
it was common to transfer wealth, either during life or at death, to
trusts that benefited issue of the transferor with avoidance of estate
taxes-until the RAP2 eventually required vesting of interest with
respect to trust assets in individuals who, at their death, would
generate another opportunity for the imposition of transfer taxes. To
cope with this multi-generational avoidance of estate taxes, Congress
enacted a generation-skipping transfer tax (GST) in 1976.' Later, in
1986, it enacted an improved version of the GST.4
Since 1986, the GST has provided a limited exemption from the
tax, which is relevant to our considerations This exemption allows
individuals to transfer a limited amount of property to individuals or

See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006(a) (1976), (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 2601).
2 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed. 1942).

3 Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 2006(a).
4 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431(a), (codified at I.R.C.
§

2601).
5 I.R.C. § 2631.
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trusts without imposition of the tax. Typically such sums, if not
consumed, would be subject to estate tax at the death of the individual
transferee or at the death of the individual to whom trust assets were
transferred. Moreover, in the case of trusts that made use of the GST
exemption, because of the RAP, which required vesting of interest
within the Rule's measuring period, even property placed in such an
exempt trust would eventually be subject to any estate tax, assuming
that assets of sufficient value were present.
In the scenario as outlined above, it is apparent that, in the
absence of the RAP, a trust to which assets were transferred with use
of the exemption would provide perpetual relief from the estate tax.
Focusing on this, and sensing the opportunity to enable local financial
institutions and attorneys to harvest a bounty of fees and
commissions, a number of states have repealed the RAP.6 Potential
clients are promised that, within a period of years, assets transferred
to trusts managed by local financial institutions will blossom into
fortunes for the descendents of the transferors that will escape estate
taxation forever. For example, Richard Nenno, a leading expert on
6

According to a Richard Nenno, a leading authority on dynasty trusts, the

following jurisdictions allow perpetual trusts (no RAP): Alaska, Arizona, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia,
and Wisconsin. Richard W. Nenno, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: Tax Planning and
Jurisdiction Selection (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 2007), SM077 ALI-ABA
509, at app. D. Moreover, Nenno reports that the following states allow trusts to be
formed for very long periods of time: Colorado (1,000 years), Florida (360 years),
Nevada (365 years), Utah (1,000 years), Washington (150 years), and Wyoming (1,000
years). Id. at § V.D.4.f. In addition, since the publication of Nenno's article, at least
three additional states (North Carolina, Tennessee, and Michigan) have repealed or
limited their RAP. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-23 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-1202(f) (2008) (allowing trusts up to 360 years); 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts 148 (allowing
perpetual trusts for personal property only). At least 26 states and the District of
Columbia, therefore, have no RAP or have an extremely long period of time that
private (as contrasted to charitable) trusts may exist.
7 The subject is discussed favorably in the popular press. See,
e.g., Carole
Gould, Shifting Rules Add Luster to Trusts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000; Kiplinger
Washington Editors, An Enduring Trust that Could Work for You, KIPLINGER'S
RETIREMENT REP., May 2005 [hereinafter, Enduring Trust]; Rachel Emma Silverman,
Looser Trust Laws Lure $100 Billion: Amid CongressionalScrutiny, Huge Sums Pour
Into States That Allow 'Dynasty Trusts', WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at D1; Rachel
Emma Silverman, Building Your Own Dynasty: States Toss Out Restrictions on
Creating Perpetual Trusts; Downside-Fees Last Forever, Too, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15,
2004, at D1. Those who stand to profit from creation and maintenance of dynasty
trusts promote them on the internet. See, e.g., Bob Bauman, Create a Tax-Free
Inheritance Dynasty with Your Assets, SOVEREIGN SOC'Y, Jan. 17, 2008,
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and proponent of dynasty trusts, provides the following contrasting

examples-which are admittedly oversimplified-of a dynasty trust
funded with $1,000,000 and a bequest that is subject to estate tax at
45% every 25 years:
Assuming a 3% return, the Exempt Dynasty Trust would be
worth $19,218,632 whereas the no trust arrangement would be

worth only $1,758,625 at the end of 100 years. Assuming a
10% return, the Exempt Dynasty Trust would be worth
$13,780,612,340 whereas the no trust arrangement would be

worth only $1,261,012,158 at century's end. These examples,
which are oversimplified, assume that either no distributions
would be made or that an after-tax return of the indicated
8
rate could be earned despite distributions.
It should come as no surprise that the rush to repeal the RAP has
attracted considerable scholarly commentary. 9 Moreover, the

http://www.sovereignsociety.com/vmembers.php?nid=2449&printable=y (the entity
Sovereign Society, which sponsors this site, is an organization dedicated to promoting
offshore investing activities); AlaskaUSA Trust Company, Alaska's Unique Benefits,
http://www.alaskausatrust.com/trustee/alaskaBenefits.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2009)
(AlaskaUSA is an Alaska trust company); Pioneer Bank & Trust, Trust ServicesDynasty Trust, http://www.pioneerbankandtrust.com/dynastyjtrust.htm (last visited
Feb. 6, 2009) (Pioneer Bank & Trust is a South Dakota Bank). Richard Nenno of
Wilmington Trust Company has made a number of detailed scholarly presentations
promoting "perpetual dynasty trusts." See, e.g., Nenno, supra note 6. Also, a Westlaw
or Lexis search using his name and "dynasty trust" will bring up a considerable
number of presentations.
8 Nenno, supra note 6, at § II.B.2.
See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax
Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511 (2006); Stephen E. Greer, The
Alaska Dynasty Trust, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 253 (2001); Brian Layman, Perpetual
Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful Tools in the Estate Planner'sArsenal, 32
AKRON L. REV. 747 (1999); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Perpetuities
or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDoZO L. REV. 2465
9

(2006) [hereinafter Perpetuities or Taxes?] (empirically attributing the repeal
movement to the GST exemption); Stewart E. Sterk, JurisdictionalCompetition to
Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities:R.LP. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097
(2003); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV.

2588 (2003). Following closely on the heels of the rush to repeal the RAP has been a
movement to allow for the establishment of self-settled spendthrift trusts, another
unfortunate event that is not the focus of this paper. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M.
Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of

Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 378-85 (2005) [hereinafter Jurisdictional
Competition]. It should come as no surprise that some of the very states that took the
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government has also focused on the possibility of repealing the GST

exemption that makes the dynasty trust possible. 0 Although the
authors are personally disappointed with the wholesale rush to repeal
the RAP and also believe that something should be done to cabin the

GST exemption, those concerns are not the focus of this article.
The purpose of this article is to illustrate that, although use of the
GST exemption to permanently avoid estate tax may make good
sense from an estate planning standpoint, it is unlikely to create
dynastic wealth for a number of reasons. The cost of managing and
maintaining such wealth, normal income tax burdens, and other
associated costs will all conspire to cut back on the explicit or implicit

promise made by promoters of dynasty trusts. Additionally, inflation,
rising expectations, and an ever-growing army of surviving
descendents of the settlor and their dependents will encroach on the
real value to a family of the accumulated wealth. In most cases,
families will be extremely lucky if the growing funds in the trust keep
up with the growing appetites and the number of outstretched hands
on the other side of the equation. The purpose of the article is not to
argue against use of the GST exemption in the post-RAP world but

rather to demonstrate that, in all but a few lucky cases, settlors of
dynasty trusts are unlikely to actually establish dynastic wealth with
their so-called dynasty trusts." Moreover, in the wrong circumstances,
lead in the race to repeal the RAP, likely motivated by the same interest in creating a
local trust business, also have led the movement to allow for self-settled spendthrift
trusts. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110 (2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2571
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.040(1)(b) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2-2 to -5
(2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-16-1 to -16 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §25-6-14
(2007).
10 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109th CONG, OPTIONS
TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES, at 392-95 (Joint Comm. Print
2005). The chair of the Senate Finance Committee and the ranking member of the
minority charged the staff to, among other things, make recommendations to close
loopholes. The dynasty trust was one of the abuses singled out for attention. Basically,
the staff recommended that the exemption be limited to a skip of one generation and
no more. No action has been taken to date.
1 The threshold for "dynastic wealth" is open to debate. It is instructive that,
according to the United States Census Bureau, in 2006, household income of $174,012
would be required for a family to rank in the top 5% of all households-hardly a sum
that would make most readers feel that they had reached the level of dynastic wealth.
U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables- Households, Table H-i,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/hOlar.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
As will be apparent in most cases, it will be impossible for individual beneficiaries of
dynasty trusts to receive this level of support from a dynasty trust. In some cases,
intact families of modest size may receive support from such a trust that will place it
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for example estates where, due to their size or a repeal of the estate
tax, no tax will be due from successor generations, such trusts are
likely to impose additional unnecessary expenses that will actually

diminish future family wealth. 2
This article will first discuss the basic structure of the GST and

how its exemption can be used to permanently escape estate taxes.
Next, it will discuss the march toward repeal of the RAP across the
states. This will be followed by a discussion of the cost factors that are
likely to reduce the yield for generation-skipping trusts. This leads to

a discussion of the erosion of the value of trust corpus caused by
inflation, rising expectations, and a growing army of trust beneficiaries
who will look to the trust for support. These considerations will then
be presented in a series of mathematical formulae. Lastly, there will
be a discussion of the real, but limited, value such trusts can have for

families.
I. THE GST EXEMPTION

The generation-skipping transfer tax, which generally seeks to

insure payment of a transfer tax at least every generation, is imposed
at a rate of 45% on all generation-skipping transfers. 3 "Direct skips,"
"taxable terminations," and "taxable distributions" are the three types
of transfers that are taxed under the GST. 14 A "direct skip" is a

transfer to a "skip person," who is an individual two or more
generations younger than the donor.' 5 Because this article is only

within the top 5% of all households, although the authors would be wont to classify
such families as living the life of the dynastically wealthy. See infra Appendix.
12 To guard against such eventualities, a well-drafted
trust should contain a
provision that allows for termination of the trust.
13 See I.R.C. § 2601 (establishing the existence of the GST tax); I.R.C.
§ 2641(a)
(incorporating the maximum Federal estate tax rate into the GST tax rate); I.R.C. §
2001(c)(2)(B) (declaring the current maximum Federal estate tax rate to be 45%).
14 I.R.C. § 2611.
15 See I.R.C. §§ 2613, 2651. The spouse of a donor is always deemed to be in the
same generation as the donor, regardless of their disparity in ages. If family members
are involved, generations are determined based on common understanding. For
example, a transfer from a grandparent to a grandchild would involve a generation
skip (unless the child of the donor from whom the grandchild is descended is dead, in
which case no skip would be present). Where individuals are not lineally related,
generations are deemed to consist of age cohorts that are within 25 year bands and an
individual born within 12 h years of the donor is deemed to be of the donor's
generation with the result that for a generation-skipping transfer to be present, the
donee must be at least more than 37 years younger than the donor.
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concerned with dynasty trusts, direct skips need not concern us
further. Taxable terminations and taxable distributions involve
property held in trust and will consequently be of concern to our
examination of dynasty trusts.
A taxable distribution is a distribution from a trust of property to
a person who is a skip person. For example, if a grandmother
established and funded a non-exempt trust, which then transferred
trust corpus or trust income to a grandchild or to a great-grandchild,
such a transfer would be a "taxable distribution," and GST would be
due at the rate of 45%.
A taxable termination involves the termination of an interest in a
trust by death, passage of time, or release of a power which
commonly, although not always, results in the receipt by a skip person
of either trust corpus or income. For example, assume a grandfather
established and funded a trust with his son as income beneficiary, and
at the death of his son, the son's children were to succeed him as
income beneficiaries. At the son's death there would be a taxable
termination (of son's interest) triggering a GST tax on the underlying
trust property. Similarly, if the trust instrument called for termination
of the trust at the son's death and distribution of trust corpus to the
son's children, any such distribution at son's death would constitute a
taxable termination.
Congress decided that not every generation-skipping transfer
need be taxed. Two significant exemptions are provided. First, the
GST does not apply to inter vivos gifts involving direct skips which are
exempt from gift tax under either the annual per donee exemption
(currently $13,000)16 or the exemption for education and medical
expenses. 17 Second, and most important for our purposes, each donor
is entitled, pursuant to Code section 2631, to a lifetime exemption
from GST equal to the amount of the estate tax exemption. This
means that the amount of the GST exemption for 2008 was $2,000,000
and for 2009 it is $3,500,000.18 For example, assume that a grandfather
established and funded a $2,000,000 trust in 2008 in a jurisdiction
which did not have the RAP. Assume further that his trust provided
16

I.R.C. § 2503(b). This exemption is available only if the transferee is an

individual or a trust with a single beneficiary. The amount of this exemption may be
doubled if the spouse of the donor allows the donor to make use of the spouses
annual per donee exemption. I.R.C. § 2513(a)(1).
17 I.R.C. § 2642(c).
18 I.R.C. § 2631. As in the case of the annual per donee exemption, this amount
may be doubled if one spouse allows the other to use her or his lifetime GST
exemption. I.R.C. §2513(a)(1).
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that, for the first 50 years, all trust income and gains from sales of trust
assets were to be retained by the trust, and thereafter income was to
be distributed per stirpes to his living issue. Finally, assume that
grandfather also elected to use his GST exemption to cover the trust.
The result would be that neither the taxable transfer nor the taxable
distribution rules of the GST would apply to the trust, and no estate
tax would ever be due on any assets held in the trust. This is the
exemption that promoters of dynasty trusts seek to exploit. They
promise would-be settlors dynastic wealth based on freedom from
transfer taxation up to the amount of the exemption, simply by
moving trust assets to their jurisdiction and compounding interest
forever.

II. RIP FOR RAP
The nonexistence of the RAP in a jurisdiction is key to the
promise that transfer taxes will be avoided forever by use of the GST
exemption. The classic articulation of the RAP was provided by John
Chipman Gray: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of
the interest."'1 9
The consequence of the RAP for those who may wish to avail
themselves of the exemption provided by Code section 2631 and
establish a dynasty trust is that, within the measuring period of the
rule, the trust would have to be terminated and the property would
eventually be subject to transfer tax liability at the time it is
transferred by its owner either by gift or devise. Thus, to establish a
dynasty trust that will escape transfer tax liability forever, it is
essential that the law of a jurisdiction that has repealed the RAP
govern the trust.
Idaho and Wisconsin had effectively abolished the RAP prior to
the passage of the GST.' ° A number of states have more recently

19

GRAY, supra note 2, at 191. Despite its seeming simplicity, the RAP has

proven to be one of the more complicated rules with which property lawyers must
deal. Professor Haskell, a distinguished authority on the law of trusts, has called it
"one of the most difficult areas of our law." Paul G. Haskell, A Proposalfor a Simple
and Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities,66 N.C. L. REv. 545, 545 (1988).
20 Although each of these states can be said to have repealed the RAP, they
had
required that a trust holding assets must be able to alienate those assets within the
conventional RAP measuring period-a life in being plus twenty-one years. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 55-111 (2008); WIS. STAT. § 700.16(1)(a) (2007). Among those states
which have subsequently abolished the RAP, apparently only Rhode Island has not
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seized upon the opportunity created by the new tax and its exemption
by effectively repealing their RAP.2' Apparently, the primary
motivation was to attract trust business to the repealing state which
would enrich local financial institutions and members of the bar.22
South Dakota, Delaware, and Alaska led the race to the bottom, or
top, as one's perspective would dictate. 23 At last count, at least twentysix states and the District of Columbia had repealed their RAP, 24 and
the trend is for still others to do so in the near future as states seek to
catch-up with their rivals in attracting trust activities and legal work to
their jurisdictions.
It is no surprise that this development has given rise to a storm of
scholarship 2' commenting on various aspects of this rather sudden
development in an area of the law where things seem to move at a
leisurely pace. A common theme is the potential that trusts,
unencumbered by the RAP, have to build dynastic wealth for families.
Consider the following:
A dynasty trust can rank right up there with dogs and
diamonds as man's and woman's best friends. And the more
affluent you are, the more valuable the trust may be to you
and your heirs. A dynasty trust can cut a taxable estate, shield
appreciating assets from estate and generation-skipping
transfer taxes for decades, and ensure that they pass to your
grandchildren and great-grandchildren. And it's a popular
strategy: States that have relaxed their laws on the lifespan of
trusts have seen an influx of billions of dollars in trust assets.26

imposed the requirement that the trustee holding trust assets must be able to alienate
those assets within the normal RAP period. Note, supra note 9, at 2591.
21 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, Perpetuitiesor Taxes?, supra note 9, at 2474-75;
Sterk, supra note 9, at 2102-04; Note, supra note 9, at 2593. Obviously, we are
indebted to Professor Sterk for coming up with the catchy phrase "RIP for RAP",
which we have embraced in the text.
22 Sterk, supra note 9, at 2103-04.
23 Id. at 2101-02. South Dakota actually had repealed its RAP in 1983, seven
years after passage of the 1976 version of the GST, as part of an overall program to
make its laws more attractive to financial institutions. It was not until replacement of
the 1976 GST with the 1986 version of the GST that the real race to repeal RAP
began in earnest.
24 See supra note 6.
25

id.

26

See Enduring Trust, supra note 7.
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Such promises may appeal to those contemplating placing some of
their wealth in a dynasty trust. In addition, the hype is helpful to those
who make a living setting up and managing such trusts. When one
takes a closer look, however, at the real costs and benefits involved
and then measures them against the likely needs and expectations of
the settlor's descendents, the promise of dynastic wealth tends to slip
away.
III. EVALUATING THE CLAIMS OF DYNASTY TRUST PROMOTERS

To properly evaluate the potential of so-called dynasty trusts to
build dynastic wealth, it is necessary to estimate several likely net
returns on investments that will be realized by a dynasty trust over a
period of years. This value should next be measured against the
impact of both inflation and rising expectations of trust beneficiaries.
Consideration of the impact of rising expectations as well as inflation
is important as very few, if any, typical members of a younger
generation would be happy with the standard of living prevailing at
the time that the trust was established. It will also be essential to
consider that, as a typical family progresses through the decades, new
living members will be added to the family tree at a geometric rate,
and older members, after typically spending scores of years as
beneficiaries of the trust, will pass from the tree at a slower rate than
new beneficiaries are being added." All the forgoing factors will, in
most cases, impact negatively on promises of promoters to create
dynastic wealth, thereby turning a typical "dynasty trust" into a tax
sheltered family support trust of limited, but welcome, worth. To gain
an appreciation of how such factors will impact typical dynasty trusts,
it is necessary to consider each of the above factors separately.
A. The Gross Rate of Return

Dynasty trust assets are likely to be invested in a portfolio that
provides a relatively stable rate of return over the years and maintains
the trust corpus in a highly liquid form that will facilitate eventual
distributions to trust beneficiaries. An investment strategy that
includes the common stock of large companies is consistent with these
27 To understand this point, it may be helpful to envision a family tree as a
pyramid with members of the most senior generation at the top and members of the
most junior generation at the base. As members are carved off by death at the top of
the pyramid, those added at the bottom are likely to exceed in number those removed
from the top.
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goals. It is also possible that a trustee could decide to vary trust
holdings and create an admixture of large and small equities and
government and corporate indebtedness instruments. The following
chart, which is based on historic rates of return from 1925 to 2005,
indicates the gross return that is likely to be realized by each of the
possible investment choices over the years.
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Table 1: Average Annual Total Return on Liquid Investments's
Investment

Average Return

Large Company Stocks
'Small Company Stocks
Long-Term Corporate Bonds
Long-Term Governments
Intermediate-Term
Governments
U.S. Treasury Bills
Inflation

10.4%
12.6%
5.9%
5.5%
5.3%
3.7%
3.0%

To evaluate the rate of return realized by a dynasty trust, it is
important to consider at least four other factors: (1) costs associated
with generating the return to arrive at a net rate of return; (2) the

28

IBBOTSON

ASSOCIATES,

STOCKS,

BONDS,

BILLS,

AND

INFLATION

2006

YEARBOOK 31 tbl.2-1 (2006). The figure provided is the geometric mean. This is a

mean that is used when the first number in a series is multiplied by, rather than added
to, the second number (and following numbers) in a series. It is typically used to
average rates of return to reflect compounding of both gains and losses. This should
be contrasted with an arithmetic mean which merely averages all rates of return and
can thereby produce inaccurate results. The geometric mean is determined by
multiplying a sequence of numbers in a series (set n) by each other and then taking
the nth root of the product. It is most commonly used when one is attempting to
determine the average rate of return (the rate that would have to be realized each
year) when rates of return vary from year to year. For example, if an investment
realized a rate of return of 20% in the first year and 60% in the second year, the
geometric mean rate of return would be 38.56%, whereas the arithmetic rate of return
would be 40%. The accuracy of the geometric mean can be verified by the fact that
multiplying $100 by 1.3856 twice will yield the same sum ($191.99) as will multiplying
$100 by 1.2 and then multiplying that result ($120) by 1.6. On the other hand, using
the arithmetic mean as an interest rate to determine the compounded return would
result in the investor erroneously determining that he had an investment worth
$196.00. Throughout this Article any reference to "average" for terms such as rates of
return and tax rates shall be deemed to refer to the geometric mean.
The results above for small cap companies are likely to be difficult to replicate
given experiences in the market over the last half century. For example, the Vanguard
Small Cap Index Fund reports that since its inception on October 3, 1960, its value
rose at an average rate of 9.47%. Vanguard Small-Cap Index Fund Investor Shares,
https:H/personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/snapshot?FundId=OO48&FundlntExt=INT#
hist::tab-0 (last visited Feb. 12, 2009). The return had been reduced because of recent
turmoil in financial markets. In recent years, Vanguard has introduced so-called
Admiral shares that benefit investors with large holdings. These shares, due to lower
management fees, are likely to grow by an additional 0.11%. Vanguard Small-Cap
Index
Fund
Admiral
Shares,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/
snapshot?Fundld=0548&FundlntExt=INT#hist::tab=l (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
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impact of inflation on the return; (3) the impact of rising expectations
in the generations which will be receiving distributions from the trust;
and (4) the number of beneficiaries who are likely to be enjoying the
distributions from the trust.
B. Typical Trust Costs

The typical trust will confront a number of costs that will cut into
the gross yield on investments and thereby diminish the rate at which
trust corpora will increase over the years. Among the costs that one
would expect to encounter are the following: trustee fees for taking
custody of the trust corpus, investment expenses, and expenses
associated with the employment of professionals such as tax
preparers, accountants, and lawyers.29 In addition, one would expect

that tax liabilities of the trust would reduce the annual rate of return.
The impact of these items will be discussed below.
1. Trustee Fees and Investment Expenses
According to two highly knowledgeable sources, 30 the amount

charged by a bank or trust company for custodial and investment
services will vary considerably. Among the factors that are likely to
impact the fees are: (1) whether the custodial institution has an
existing relationship with the family and as a consequence has a

significant amount of wealth under management for the family;3' (2)
the amount and quality of the services that are rendered;3 2 (3) whether

29

One would expect that, in the early days of a trust, tax returns could typically

be prepared by the trustee at little expense. As time passes and the trust grows, it
would be expected that professional outside tax preparers would be involved. See
Telephone Interview with Joel Pineles, President & Richard Yeomans, Vice
President, Piedmont Financial Trust Company (Feb. 22, 2008). Piedmont Financial
Trust Company is a private trust company that manages the financial affairs and
investments for an extended single wealthy family.
3 Id.
31 For example, if the family has considerable wealth under management with
the institution, the trust may only be charged a modest trust management and
custodial fee in the range of 0.4-0.5%; whereas if there is no existing relationship of
substantial magnitude, one may expect to be charged combined custodial and
investment management fees in the range of 1-1.2%. In addition, one would also
expect to encounter a charge for investment management and normal trading
expenses and brokerage commissions. See id.
32 Dealing with a complicated trust instrument or a contentious family could be
expected to drive up the fees that would be charged by a financial institution. See id.
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plain vanilla or sophisticated investment services are provided;3 3 (4)
the type of investment and management services that must be
provided;m and (5) whether it is necessary to involve outside
professionals in dealing with complicated legal and investment
activities.35 When all is said and done, absent an existing relationship

with a financial institution where the presence of great wealth already
under management is likely to result in significant discounting, one
could expect that custodial fees, investment expenses, and other
professional fees are likely to result in a total diminution of gross

investment returns by something in the neighborhood of 1-2% of
corpus, with the likely cost lying somewhere in between. 36
2. The Tax Burden

A settlor of a dynasty trust invariably will want the trust to
accumulate all income for a long period of time so that it grows to the
maximum amount that is reasonably prudent prior to making
distributions. To do otherwise would diminish the capital held by the

trust that will benefit from the "magic" of compound interest. For
example, if a trust realizes a net return of 8% but makes an annual
distribution of 2%, the trust will be growing at the lower rate of 6%. 3

Unfortunately, for those trust settlors who wish to build dynastic
wealth, income that is accumulated by a trust and is not distributed is
subject to taxation at sharply escalating rates. For tax years beginning

33 Use of a bank's comingled investment trust would be expected
to keep

investment and custodial fees down at the lower range of the spectrum (0.6-0.7%),
whereas investment in conventional long-term equity holdings would result in
expenses at a higher range (0.8-1.5%) and more aggressive investment strategies
would result in even higher fees (2-3%). See id.
For example, if the trustee were responsible for management of a farm, a
business, or rental real estate versus being allowed to merely invest all trust funds in
an index fund, one would expect to find considerable variance in the fees charged by
the financial institution trustee. See id.
35 Hiring attorneys to engage in litigation (e.g., to deal with contentious
beneficiaries) or tax professionals to prepare complicated tax returns or handle
disputes with the Internal Revenue Service (Service) are examples of situations that
would result in significant costly expenditures involving outside professionals.
36 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
37 The significance of this can be demonstrated by the fact that a trust with an
initial corpus of $1,000,000 that grows at a rate of 6% per year will be worth
$18,420,136 at the end of fifty years. This should be contrasted with a trust that
realized an 8% rate of return over the same period of time. This latter trust would, at
the end of the fifty year period, have a value of $46,901,572.
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in 2009, by the time accumulated income exceeds $ 11,150, it is taxed
at the top rate of 35%.38 At present, dividends and long-term capital
gains are taxed at a maximum rate of 15% 39 rather than the 35% rate
that may otherwise prevail. These preferential rates for dividends and
capital gains are of recent vintage and may prove to be only
temporary. Consequently, settlors of dynasty trusts confront a difficult
and unpredictable task in estimating the degree to which taxes will
impact the net return realized on the trust corpus. To cope with the
issue of capital gains taxes, the option of investing trust corpus in a
tax-managed index fund 4° is an alternative. This path, however, may
have a negative impact on investment returns.
The potential negative impact of state income taxes on trust
income can be dealt with by selecting, as a situs for the trust, a state
that does not impose state income taxes on accumulated trust income.
Indeed, Professors Sitkoff and Schanzenbach have demonstrated that
unless a state that has repealed its RAP also provides an exemption
from income taxes for accumulated trust income, the state is unlikely
to realize any measurable increase in trust service activities for
financial institutions located within the state. 41
When all is said and done, one can reasonably expect that the
impact of federal income taxes on net trust income will be to reduce it
by something between 4% and 35%. The range would depend on the
type of investments chosen for the trust. For example, if trust income
were derived from investments that were subject to tax at the top 35%
rate, the impact on the trust's net rate of return would be to reduce
the net return by 35%. Whereas, had trust assets been invested in a
tax-managed portfolio (perhaps in a tax-managed mutual fund) of
common stock, the negative impact of taxes on the trust's rate of

See I.R.C. § 1(e). The tables for taxation of trusts and many other entities are
revised annually to adjust for inflation. The threshold of $11,150 for imposition of the
maximum rate on accumulated trust income for 2009 was promulgated by the Service
in Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 45 I.R.B. 1110.
39 See I.R.C. § 1(h).
40 A tax-managed fund is one in which investments are managed
to minimize
passing any taxable gains out to investors. This is typically done by investing in assets
that produce only small amounts of taxable income each year (which, if possible, is
taxed at a reduced rate), but produce significant amounts of unrealized gains each
year. This often involves minimizing turnover of assets, as is done by an index fund,
and by matching up sales at a gain of investment securities held by the fund against
sales of such securities at a loss. Many large index funds attempt to tax-manage fund
investments.
41 Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, JurisdictionalCompetition, supra note 9.
38
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return would be in the neighborhood of about 4%.42 This 4% effective
rate on trust investment returns is based on the assumption that all
assets are invested in stock that qualifies for the 15% maximum tax on
dividends, appreciation in trust assets plus dividend income
approximates 10% per year, dividends approximate 2% of the trust
corpus, and no taxable capital gains are realized due to taxmanagement of the portfolio. This set of assumptions is likely
implausible to realize over an extended period of time. Moreover, it
must be considered that even this low effective rate of 4% is
predicated on the 15% tax on capital gains and dividends lasting
indefinitely, something that requires a head in the sand approach
43
toward the present political environment and budgetary deficit.
In most cases, one would expect that the impact of federal taxes
would rise somewhat above this 4% figure but that it would still skew
toward the low end of the range, perhaps consuming something close
to 8-10% of the total annual increase in the trust corpus. Given that
the goal of establishing a dynasty trust would be significantly
frustrated by an investment policy that resulted in the payment of
significant taxes, the trustee would favor investments that minimized
the tax burden borne by the trust on undistributed income. 44 It must

42

For example, assume that dividends approximating 2% of the value of stocks

(close to the dividend return on the S&P 500) held by a mutual fund were all that was
received in the form of taxable income and they are taxed at 15%. This would likely
reduce the return on dividends by about an absolute 0.3% (2% minus tax on that sum
at the rate of 15%). If the net pretax return were 8% (including stock appreciation
and dividends) the return would be reduced by 3.75% to a net of 7.7%. Of course, if
the trust had invested in assets that produced a return that was fully taxable, then,
given a maximum rate of 35%, the trust's income would be reduced by 35%. Quite
obviously, a well managed dynasty trust is likely to avoid such investments and will
likely concentrate on investments that produce little annual taxable income but rather
experience significant appreciation in the underlying asset pool, such as a taxmanaged mutual fund.
43 The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities has estimated that
if federal
government spending and tax policies that had prevailed through 2008 had continued,
the deficit as a percent of gross domestic product would rise from 1.7% to 1.9% from
2008 to 2018. See JAMES R. HORNEY, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE SEES NO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN BUDGET

OUTLOOK (2007), available at http://www.cbpp.org/8-23-07bud.htm.
4 For example, a trustee may decide to invest in speculative realty that produces
no periodic income with the goal of realizing capital gains on the investment and
thereby reaping the advantage of deferring taxes far into the future when the property
is sold. Unfortunately, implementation of such a strategy, although perhaps worthy
for an individual may involve the trust in management activities and fees that would
consume any tax savings. Moreover, the trustee's fiduciary duty toward the
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also be conceded that such a strategy would result in some loss of
flexibility that would have, at least, a modest negative impact on gross
negative total return.
C. The Impact of Inflation
All too often, investors overestimate the real return that they are
receiving on investments by failing to take into account the corrosive
effect of inflation on their investments. Moreover, given that investors
are taxed on the portion of their gains that merely represents
inflation, they are actually being taxed on their real returns at a higher
effective rate than the stated rate of an income tax.
As Table One indicates, inflation has historically run at the rate of
about 3% per year. 5 Roughly speaking, that means that if one were to
realize a net return of 8%, after accounting for trust costs, investment
expenses and taxes, the real inflation adjusted return would be close
to 5%. For the fifty year period from 1956 to 2006, the impact of
inflation meant that it would take $7.41 in 2006 to have the equivalent
46
purchasing power of $1.00 in 1956. As will be discussed below, to
gain a measure of the value of a return on an investment that will be
used to finance consumption by an individual or a group of individuals
in the future, it is also necessary to account for rising expectations as
subsequent generations seek to maintain their standard of living
relative to society.
D. The Issue of Rising Expectations
Settlors of dynasty trusts are likely to wish to do more than
provide an inflation adjusted pool of income for future beneficiaries.
It is quite likely that settlors would hope to allow their family to
maintain the family's relative standard of living in the larger societythe macroeconomic equivalent of "keeping up with the Joneses." If
trust distributions are to maintain a family's relative place in the
standard of living pecking order, it will be necessary for investments
to do more than merely keep up with inflation. For example, because

beneficiaries would normally bar such a strategy unless the trust instrument explicitly
authorized the investment strategy and held the trustee harmless in the event it
produced unsatisfactory results. Given the normal expectations of settlors, such steps
would be most unusual.
45 See supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
46 BUREAU

OF

LABOR

STATISTICS,

CPI

INFLATION

http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).

CALCULATOR,
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the market basket of a typical middle class American now consists of
central air conditioning, two cars per family, built-in cook tops, and
self-cleaning wall ovens instead of the fans, a single automobile, and
free standing ranges that comprised the middle class American market
basket fifty years ago, measuring the inflation of the latter market
basket is deceiving.
Determining precisely how much the standard of living has risen
in a given period of time and then adjusting it for inflation could prove
to be a difficult task. Fortunately, the Social Security Administration,
(SSA), as part of its obligation to adjust the benefits formula to
account for both inflation and the rise in the standard of living over7
the years, is required to calculate the "national average wage index.,
This figure provides a fairly accurate means of adjusting amounts for
both inflation and rise in the standard of living. For example, the
national average wage for 1956 was $3,532.36 whereas by 2006, it had
risen to $38,651.41, 48 reflecting both inflationary forces and rise in the
standard of living. The ratio of the 1956 figure to the 2006 figure is
1:10.94. To put it differently, the "national average wage" has been
increasing over the last fifty years at an average rate of about 4.9 %.4
The principal reason this figure exceeds the mere increase due to
inflation is the rise in the standard of living that followed from the real
increase in the power of earnings over the period in question.
IV. MALTHUS ENTERS THE PICTURE

In An Essay on the Principles of Population,Thomas Malthus, an
Anglican priest who had majored in mathematics at Cambridge,
argued that given that population increased geometrically, whereas it
was only possible to add new farmland to production arithmetically,
near famine and resulting warfare over food resources were
inevitable. 0 Modern agricultural techniques, extensive use of
fertilizers and pesticides, as well as new crops have all combined to
keep Malthus' predictions from becoming a reality. His basic

47

See

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AUTOMATIC INCREASES, NATIONAL

AVERAGE WAGE INDEX,

http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/COLAIAWI.html (last

visited Feb. 12, 2008).
48ld.

49 At a rate of 4.9%, the ratio of the 1956 average national wage to the
2006

average wage would actually be 1:10.93 rather than the actual ratio of 1:10.94. The
difference is statistically insignificant.
50 See THOMAS MALTHUS, ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION (GBR
ElecBook 2001) (1798).
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observations, however, have considerable application to our situation.
Families, like national populations, increase geometrically, and unless
resources in a dynasty trust grow at a rate sufficient to keep up with
the expectations of the ever increasing living members of the
beneficiary class who will look to the trust for support, the demand for

distributions from the trust will eventually exceed the ability of the
trust to satisfy that demand."
Before discussing the impact of geometric growth of population
any further, a simple example based on the actual facts of the family
of one of the authors may help to establish the basic nature of the
problem. Fifty years ago, one of us and our brother and sister and
were teenagers. Assume that one of our parents (they are recently
deceased) then placed $1,000,00012 in a trust that would be forever
free from estate taxation and that the trust after accounting for all
investment and administration expenses and income taxes produced

an annual net rate of return of 8%," resulting in a total trust corpus
worth $46,901,572. 54 Fortunately for us and unfortunately for any
51 The issue of a growing number of beneficiaries over the course
of the decades

for perpetual trusts, principally as it applies to growing complexity for trust
administrators, is briefly discussed at Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of
the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1339 (2003).
52 We have chosen to use $1,000,000 as the starting point
for the illustration for
purposes of simplicity. If any reader is tempted to object on the ground that in 2008
the GST exemption was $2,000,000 and in 2009 it is $3,500,000, we would note that
using $1,000,000 actually likely gives a reader an excessively optimistic outlook on the
power of a dynasty trust in the present era. If we were to presume that the inflation
adjusted equivalent of the $3,500,000 exemption ($472,335) had been used to fund the
trust fifty years ago, then we would have to adjust the amount in the trust today to
reduce it to 47.23% of the $46,901,572 figure or $22,153,254 or a little less than
$1,000,000 per beneficiary in the example, hardly a sum that anyone would consider
sufficient to support a dynastic lifestyle for the twenty-three beneficiaries.
53 A net return to the trust of 8% was chosen for the example based on
the
following considerations. First, using Ibbotson data, we settled on a starting point of a
rate of return of 10.4% based on the return on large company stock. See supra note 28
and accompanying text. We then reduced this gross figure by 1.5% to reflect the
impact of custodial fees, investment expenses, and the like. See supra notes 30-36 and
accompanying text. This was then further reduced by 0.9% to reflect what we
presumed would be the expected income tax burden on accumulated income. See
supra, notes 37-44 and accompanying text. To present the impact of somewhat lower
costs and taxes, a net return of 8.5% is also discussed below on occasion with scant
appreciable negative impact on the basic thesis of the article.
The rate of return realized is of extreme importance because, over a long
period of time, even a slightly higher or slightly lower rate of return can produce
markedly divergent results. For example, if, in the above example net rates of return
of either 7.5% or 8.5% had been chosen, at the end of fifty years the original
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plans that our parents may have had to forever provide for
descendents in a grand style, each married and had children in modest
numbers and some of those children have also married and had
children, although several of our parents' grandchildren have not yet
reached the stage of family formation and it is impossible to say if
those who have had offspring will have more. All of the family,
including spouses and offspring, who are represented in the chart
below, now number twenty-three and, as one may conclude, that
number is likely to grow a bit and it is hoped that death does not
shrink the family's numbers for several decades.5 5
Table 2
X-- Y

C- - D_1

A- -B

H -- J K

G

S T

U

(Settlor Generation)

L

M N

E -F

(Senior Generation)

PQ

R (Middle Generation)

O

V

W

(Junior Generation)

Although the corpus of the trust, in going from one million to
nearly forty-seven million dollars, has outpaced the number of
individuals looking to the trust for support, our analysis must not stop
here. We next must consider the impact of both inflation and rising
expectations. As already noted, using SSA data, we have learned that
for the fifty year period from 1956 to 2006, the ratio of 1956 average
wages to 2006 average wages is almost one to eleven.56 That means to
get an idea of the purchasing power of our almost forty-seven million
dollar trust corpus and its ability to produce income to satisfy the
demands of our family we would need almost eleven dollars to replace
the purchasing power of each of our 1956 dollars. To put it another
$1,000,000 investment would have been worth $37,189,705 and $59,086,259
respectively.
55 The oldest in the senior generation is 69. According to unisex life expectancy
tables, this individual has a remaining life expectancy of 17.8 years. See I.R.S. Pub. 590
app. c.
56 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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way, adjusted for inflation and the corrosive effect of rising
expectations generated by a rising standard of living, we would need
$4.27 today to replace each 1956 dollar. Unfortunately, our group of
family members who could look to the trust for support has gone from
three to twenty-three, or to put it simply, while our adjusted resources
have a bit more than quadrupled, our outstretched hands have gone
up between seven and eight fold and more may be on the way. One
could criticize the forgoing analysis because it assigns an equal
amount of resources to each member of the extended family. It might
be more appropriate to allocate a lesser share to each member of a
married couple and an even lower amount to minor children. For
example, if we assigned a 150% share to each married couple and a
25% share to each minor child, then we would have only 15.2551
support units rather than the twenty-three support units in the original
analysis. Dividing that sum by our three original family members
would still leave us with a result in which our support units had more
than quintupled whereas our adjusted resource pool had slightly more
than quadrupled. Simply put, a dynasty trust will have great difficulty
keeping pace with inflation, rising expectations, and a geometrically
growing family even though the trust investments grow geometrically.
The news gets worse for dynasty trusts. As soon as we start
accessing the trust income, the rate at which trust assets are increasing
will decline. 8 Even modest access to a portion of the income can have
a significant effect. Suppose that, in our example, we decided to use
only three percent of trust assets each year to support the extended
family. If we assume an annual net rate of return after all expenses
and taxes of 8%, this would result in close to a static rate of return
adjusted for inflation and rising standard of living, because as has
been developed above, given the experience of the last fifty years, we
57 There

are eight married couples (three in the senior generation and five in the
middle generation) to which twelve support units would be allocated under the
support formula outlined above, two support units for the two unmarried adults in the
middle generation and one and one-quarter support units for the five individuals in
the junior generation for a total of fifteen and one-quarter support units. Quite
obviously, by assuming even lower support shares for married couples and for minors,
it would be possible create a scenario in which the dynasty trust would come up a
winner. The authors are of the opinion that the assumptions of 25% shares for minors
and 150% shares for married couples is most reasonable and perhaps a bit too
conservative. For example, children can add significantly to a family's housing needs
and the cost of private primary, secondary, and higher education can be great.
It is quite likely that delaying access to the trust for extremely long periods
will prove impractical given that few members of subsequent generations will be
enthusiastic about living diminished lives for the sake of unborn future generations.
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need a return of approximately 4.9%59 per year just to keep pace with
the average national wage. Given that the family is likely to continue
to grow geometrically whereas the trust will remain virtually static
when adjusted for inflation and rising expectations generated by a
rising standard of living, succeeding generations will see their relative
shares shrinking dramatically as the years slip by.
We should also consider several additional factors that could
make our projections even lower. First, the above example involves a
rather typical middle class family in which there are no members with
what one might consider an exceptional number of offspring. The
pressure of meeting the cost of raising offspring is likely to impact
negatively on family size in families of normal means. In a family with
considerable wealth, such pressure is lessened and family size may be
slightly larger than those in the example. Second, because all the
members in the middle generation are of child-bearing ages (ranging
in age from twenty to thirty-eight), the family in the example is likely
to have several additional members added at the most junior
generation. Third, our example has no situations in which the junior
generation has married and procreated prior to the death of the senior
generation.6 Given increasing life expectancies, such possibilities
cannot be ruled out. Fourth, the example does not illustrate the
impact of divorce, in which one or more members could be supporting
an ex-spouse, or two, as well as a spouse and several step-children as
well as offspring. Any such development would merely provide
additional pressures on the need factor and further erode our
"dynasty" trust.
There are a few solutions that are available to us to alleviate the
dire projections for typical dynasty trusts. The most obvious one is
probably the most difficult one to attain. We could realize a
significantly higher rate of return. Quite obviously this is easier to
hope for than to achieve. Professor Burton Malkiel has, in a fairly

59 See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
60 For example, in our situation the most senior member of the senior generation

is 69 years old and that individual has a life expectancy of 17.8 years based on the
Service's tables, see I.R.S. Pub. 590 app. c, whereas the oldest member of the junior
generation is 9 years old. Thus, it is entirely possible that the senior generation (or at
least several members of it) may live to overlap with members of a new generation.
There is an even greater chance that the senior generation will live to see members of
the junior generation add to the number of support units by marrying prior to the
death of the senior generation. It is also worth noting that life expectancy tables are
based on past experience and improvements in medical science are likely to extend
the life expectancies of all presently alive.
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conclusive fashion, established that the net return on professionally
managed portfolios does not, over the long haul, exceed that on
portfolios of randomly selected stocks.6 This has given rise to the
extensive interest in index funds that have become the rage in the last
twenty-five years.
The significance of obtaining a slightly higher yield on the dynasty
trust in our example is demonstrated by the fact that if the trust were
to realize a geometric mean net return of 8.5% then after fifty years,
rather than the trust corpus being worth $46,901,572, it would be6
2
worth almost twelve million dollars more or $59,086,259.
Nonetheless, even with this higher value, commencement of a policy
of distributing three percent fifty years after the trust was established
would still leave the trust with a rate of return that was doing little
more than keeping pace with the expected rise in the national average
wage. This would result, in most circumstances, in the value of the
trust being eroded as the number of surviving family members
63
increased with the coming of each new generation. Moreover,
assume instead we had commenced distribution with a corpus of
$59,086,259 at a percentage that would result in distribution of the
same dollar amount ($1,407,047) to the family that would result from
distributing three percent of the value of a corpus that would be
available to us at a return of eight percent ($46,901,572). We would
then be distributing only 2.38% of corpus annually. Unfortunately for
those who dream of dynastic wealth, this would still leave us with a
61

See BURTON G.

MALKIEL,

A

RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET

(6th ed.

1996). As Malkiel states, "No scientific evidence has yet been assembled to indicate
that the investment performance of professionally managed portfolios as a group has
been any better than that of randomly selected portfolios." Id. at 186.
62 See supra note 54. Of course, as noted previously, if the trust realized a net
return of slightly less, the results could be equally profound, but in the opposite
direction. A geometric mean return of 7.5% would result in the trust corpus being
worth only $37,189,705 after fifty years.
63 Assuming a mean annual net investment return to the trust of 8.5%, a mean
annual national average wage increase of 4.9%, as we have experienced in the past
fifty years, and assuming an annual distribution from the trust of 3% of corpus, the
trust would be left with a net annual return in excess of the national average wage of
about 0.6%. This rate of return would result in the trust corpus doubling in value after
about 118 years had run. It is almost a certainty that, in the absence of congenital
fertility problems (or the sorts of things that Malthus used to worry about: famine,
pestilence, or mass warfare), the number of surviving descendents and spouses would
double in many less years. Moreover, as the number of beneficiaries outstripped the
growth in trust corpus, limiting distributions to 3% of the annual value of trust corpus
would mean that value of the annual distribution per beneficiary would decline,
adjusted for inflation and rise in the standard of living.
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reinvestment rate of return (6.12%) that is still only slightly above the
rate of return what we need to outpace the average national wage of
4.9%. This too would be subject to the same Malthusian pressures but
at a slightly slower rate.
The next step to consider would be for families to concentrate on
diminishing the number of offspring that each member produces. For
example, if a settlor had just one child and that pattern was followed
by each succeeding generation, this would halt the pattern of
geometric growth of family members. For example, if the settlor in the
above Table Two had just one child who married and that couple had
one child who in turn married and had just one child, we would have
only five (rather than twenty three) members in the three generations
looking to the trust for support. A variation on this solution is what
likely resulted in primogeniture.6 In this case we would be able to
spread the trust distributions among fewer individuals. Note, however,
the ratio of individuals supported by the trust income to the original
descendent in the first generation would be at a ratio of 5:1. Given
that after fifty years the ratio of corpus to national average wage was
close to 4:1, this too would fail to keep pace with rising expectations.
If we were to follow the above suggested formula of allocating a 150%
share to married couples and a 25% share to minors, this would then
result in our only having to dispense enough income to cover 3.25
shares, thus a meaningful surplus would be left in the trust.
This one descendent per generation solution to the problem,
which we may call "biological primogeniture," is unlikely to be of
widespread popularity for deeply personal reasons. It is difficult to
imagine that a large segment of the wealthy population would be
willing to so restrict value-laden choices such as the number of
64 According

to Evelyn Cecil, the author of the classic history on the
development of primogeniture, "[almong the ancient Britons, an ordinary inheritance
was divided between all the sons equally; no privilege was enjoyed by the eldest; and
if any dispute arose about the division, it was determined by the Druids." EVELYN
CECIL, PRIMOGENITURE:

A SHORT HISTORY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT IN VARIOUS

COUNTRIES AND ITS PRACTICAL EFFECTS (London, Murray 1895). It was for military

defensive reasons that William the Conqueror introduced primogeniture to Briton,
first introducing it with respect to military tenures that carried with them titles of
nobility and then subsequently broadening those tenures that were subject to
primogeniture. The old system of equal division that had previously prevailed had the
great risk that as properties were divided the holders would be unable to provide the
military might that was needed to support the crown. Id. at 26-37. For an interesting
and highly readable discussion of the abolition of primogeniture in post revolution
America, see John V. Orth, After the Revolution: "Reform" of the Law of Inheritance,
10 LAW & HIST. REV. 33 (1992).
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offspring that they will have for the sake of making a dynasty trust live
up to its billing. Given that the official totalitarian Chinese
government policy of one child per couple has proven to be a failure,
one can hardly expect the voluntary adoption of such a policy among
wealthy families in a highly individualistic American society to yield
any better results in the name of making a distant settlor's dynasty
trust live up to its billing. The remaining solution is for all members of
each generation to also put their shoulders to the wheel and do their
best to replenish family wealth either through hard work and clever
61
investing or by marrying into families of equal or greater wealth.
Each new descendent (and his or her spouse) of the settlor who is well
enough off to worry about estate taxes should probably give
considerable thought to employing dynasty trusts in his or her estate
plan, but such individuals should also scale back their expectations
(and those of their families) to reflect realistically achievable
outcomes.
V. IT COULD BE WORSE
The example used thus far involves a situation in which the settlor
established and funded the trust while his or her issue was young. Had
the settlor waited to establish and fund the trust at death and allowed
it to accumulate income for fifty years, then due to the fact that there
were many more offspring at that time, by the time that fifty years had
run, we would likely be making distributions to many more than
twenty-three beneficiaries. To get some feel for what one might
encounter under such circumstances, we made certain assumptions to
project into the future. The assumptions we made are set forth below:
(1)The trust was established four years ago at the actual time of
death of the settlor used in our original paradigm.
(2) None of the members of the family will live beyond age
eighty-five, thus resulting in the eradication of the entire senior
generation within the first thirty years of the trust's existence.
(3) In the middle generation, two members will die in their early
sixties.
(4)All members of the family who will marry will do so at age
twenty-five.. The two members of the middle generation who are not

It is often said that marrying for money is the hardest way to acquire wealth
for any number of reasons. One of our colleagues is fond of quoting the sage advice of
the patriarch of an established New England family to his grandchildren: "Never
marry for money; be where money is and marry for love."
65
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presently married (M and N) will marry and each will have two
offspring.
(5)V and W will not marry and will have no offspring.
(6)Each of the members of the junior generation, other than V
and W will marry and each will have two offspring except that one
couple will have no offspring and two of the couples will have three
offspring. Only one of the members of this new generation of
offspring will be old enough to be married (twenty-five) after fifty
years.
Applying all of the above, rather conservative, assumptions to our
paradigm family results in there being forty-eight living members and
spouses fifty years after establishment and funding of this particular
dynasty trust. This larger number of beneficiaries will now be looking
to the same trust that was inadequate to fund dynastic living for our
family when it only numbered twenty-three. Clearly, waiting to fund a
so-called dynasty trust until the death of an elderly settlor will further
inhibit the ability of the settlor to found a dynasty with such a trust.
VI. A GLIMMER OF HOPE
Readers who had hoped to establish dynastic wealth with the aid
of a dynasty trust should not give up all hope. If several dynasty trusts
were established for a single family, then the clan would likely be able
to live of off the trusts for several generations. For example, if each
member of a married unit established a dynasty trust and members of
subsequent generations each had the wherewithal to do likewise, then
the benefits of such devices could be multiplied. One is likely to
encounter some practical difficulties if this is the strategy to which a
family pins its hope for attaining dynastic wealth. The primary
problem is that where there is sufficient wealth to follow this strategy,
the family is likely to be of such stature that its members are unlikely
to be satisfied with modest distributions from their trusts. In other
words, if a family that can establish two dynasty trusts has double the
expectations of another family that can only establish one such trust,
then the presence of a second trust is not likely to be of much help.
Nonetheless, if appetites for consumption are restrained and several
such trusts are established each generation, the members of family in
question are likely to be able to live comfortably off distributions from
their dynasty trusts for a number of generations. Moreover, by
establishing new trusts every generation, one is able to postpone the
ravages of Malthus to another generation. Once this is not possible,
then the clock starts ticking on the "dynasty."
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VII. DYNASTIC TRUST FORMULAE

All of the forgoing suggests that the actual outcome of a dynasty
trust is dependent on a variety of factors some of which are
controllable at the point of establishing the trust and some of which
are not. (Specific numerical examples are set out in the Appendix.)
This factor in and of itself creates an element of risk not fully captured
in the previous discussion. Nevertheless, a formulaic expression is
useful and involves three steps. The most straightforward step is to
determine the payout of the trust to would-be beneficiaries at the time
the trust will commence making regular payments. It is important to
remember, however, that even this step involves estimates with
respect to the number of beneficiaries, the earning rate, and trust
costs 6 far in the future. The per person income amount can be
expressed as:
PI = [A (Ry-c)]/Hy, where
PI = Per beneficiary income;

A = Accumulated value of the trust;
Ry = rate of return on trust in year y;
Hy = the number of beneficiaries
in year
y;
••
•
67
y the year of the trust distribution; and
c = estimated trust expense in year y.
The determination of A, the accumulated amount in the trust at
the time distributions begin is a straight forward application of the
future value formula:
A = PV(1 + NRRR)", where
A = Accumulated trust amount;
PV = Initial investment;

NRRR = net real rate of return on trust amount; and
n = number of years wealth is accumulated.
The most difficult step is the determination of NRRR. Indeed
most of the discussion thus far in this Article is ultimately about the
value attributed to NRRR. As a formula NRRR can be expressed as:
NRRR = i. - (c + t + e + rf), where

i, = average nominal rate of return on investment per year for
period n;

The term "trust cost" covers all those trust maintenance and management
expenses discussed at supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
67 Subsequent pay out years are signified by y + 1, y + 2, etc. Y = n for the year in
which the trust vests.
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c = average trust costs per year for period n;
t = average expected tax burden for a period;
e = average expectancy adjustment reflective of rising standard
of living per year for period n;
rf = average rate of inflation pre year for period n.
All components of this calculation are assumed to be constant
throughout the retention period. The retention period is the period
during which all trust income will be retained without any
distributions being made to beneficiaries.
Determining the actual outcome of the dynasty trust means
making assumptions about eight factors: (1) the number of
beneficiaries (Hy), (2) the initial investment (PV),68 (3) the rate of
return on the corpus at the time of maturity (Ry), the number of years
the trust is allowed to accumulate without making distributions (n),
the nominal return on the trust during the retention or accumulation
period (i.), trust costs (c), the tax burden on trust income as it

accumulates (t), adjustments for expectations (e), and the rate of
inflation (r). In reality only PV and n are likely to be fully in control
of the trustee at the time of establishing the trust.
A final but important observation is in order. PI (per beneficiary
distributable income) expresses the full share of each beneficiary's
income that is available for distribution each year. To avoid
diminishing the effective buying power of beneficiary income, it is
probably prudent to distribute no more than each beneficiary's share
of NRRR. Even distributing this reduced amount could be viewed as
reckless if one actually wished to insure that the trust would provide
for future generations at the same adjusted effective level. To provide
for future growth in the pool of beneficiaries as births and marriages
outpace deaths, it is probably essential to reduce the amount
distributed below the NRRR by a few percentage points.6 9
VIII. THE DYNASTY TRUST HAS REAL VALUE

The forgoing discussion is not intended to demonstrate that the
dynasty trust is valueless but rather to deflate some of the claims
made by many of the promoters that a dynasty trust will in fact build

68 In most cases this sum will be equal to (but not in excess of) the generation-

skipping tax exemption amount. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
69 If one assumes that the group will double every 24 years or so, it will be
necessary to add 3% to the NRRR, whereas if it is anticipated that the group will only
double every 36 years or so, adding 2% to the NRRR will likely be sufficient.
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dynastic wealth. Absent a dynasty trust, wealth that passes from one
generation to another would be much diminished by the weight of
estate taxes. The dynasty trust helps a family preserve wealth forever
free of the burden of estate taxes and this can be of great value, but it
is unlikely, in most cases, to establish a financial dynasty.
The value of a dynasty trust and its use of the GST tax exemption
can be illustrated with the two examples that follow. In all cases we
will assume that the trust reaps an annual net return of 8%, that the
applicable estate tax rate is 45%, and that no distributions are made
from the trust. Assume that taxpayer Allen transfers, at death,
$1,000,000 to a trust using the GST exemption. The taxpayer's
daughter, Beatrice, is the beneficiary of the trust, and the trustee is
empowered to make distributions to her if the trustee, in his sole
discretion, deems it necessary. No distributions are made, and
Beatrice dies thirty years after her father. Her son Charles is the
successor beneficiary. After another twenty years have run, it is
necessary to look to the trust to provide for Charles. At that moment,
because no estate or GST tax was due at Beatrice's death and because
the initial corpus was allowed to compound at the rate of 8%, the trust
will contain $46,901,572. This situation should be contrasted with that
of taxpayer Martha, who at death transferred $1,000,000 to an
identical trust for the benefit of her son Nicholas with his daughter
Olive as the successor beneficiary. Martha, however, did not make use
of the GST exemption with respect to the trust. As in the first
example, the settlor's child-beneficiary died after thirty years had
passed and no use was made of trust funds. At the death of Nicholas a
generation-skipping transfer tax of 45% was due because of the
settlor's failure to make use of the exemption. The consequence of
this is that, at Nicholas' death, a generation-skipping transfer tax of
$4,528,193 was due on the trust value of $10,062,652, leaving
$5,534,459 in the trust. Allowing this sum to compound at the rate of
8% for an additional 20 years prior to accessing trust corpus for the
benefit of Olive will result in only $25,795,864 being available to
provide for her needs. The difference of more that $20 million dollars
in additional funds that is available for Charles is entirely attributable
to the use of the GST exemption in the first example. It should be
noted that if the trust corpus is not accessed for several more
generations, the disparity between the two situations will be even
greater in favor of the use of the GST exemption.
Although the dynasty trust is most unlikely to live up to the
marketing hype that is created by the name that has been most
cleverly chosen for it by those who seek to profit from its creation and

2009]

MalthusianAnalysis of Dynasty Trust

809

maintenance, it, nonetheless, is a valuable tax saving device in those
circumstances where its use is appropriate. 0
IX. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IMPLICATIONS

It is fairly safe to conclude that the promises of dynasty trusts are
unlikely to be realized absent: (1) a family's waiting for a prolonged
period of time before accessing the dynasty trust, (2) confining
offspring severely for a considerable number of generations, (3)
attaining historically unprecedented investment returns for a
prolonged period of time, (4) the establishment of numerous dynasty
trusts by almost all members of a family for several generations, or (5)
some combination of the forgoing. Presumably, any competent estate
planner will feel obligated to master these complexities and explore
them with his or her client.
These aspirations are different from the affirmative
responsibilities of estate planners when clients seek their advice on
establishing a dynasty trust. Specifically, does an estate planner whose
client is contemplating setting up a dynasty trust have an obligation to
warn the client, under Rule 1.1 (obligation of competent
representation) 7' and Rule 1.4 (obligation to communicate relevant
information to client), 72 that her goals of establishing dynastic wealth
are not likely to be realized? In our opinion the Model Rules are
unlikely be construed to require an attorney to provide such an
explanation.
There are at least three reasons why an attorney who fails to
provide an explanation of the limits of a dynasty trust is unlikely to be
found professionally deficient. First, because use of the generationskipping tax exemption to fund a trust provides the client with tax
savings and is superior to not employing the exemption on a trust for
support of the family, there is no basis for the client to claim that use
70

As has been previously noted, were the estate tax to be repealed, or were the

estates of members of subsequent generations to slip below the level where estate
taxes would be imposed, maintenance of a dynasty trust could impose an unnecessary
expense for a family absent other personal factors that justified maintenance of the
trust.
71 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2008) (imposing an obligation to
provide competent representation to the client).
7 Id. at R. 1.4 (imposing an obligation on an attorney to
communicate relevant
information to a client). The obligation to "explain a matter to a client to the extent
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation" is the only obligation imposed by Rule 1.4 that would seem to be
relevant.
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of the strategy has resulted in a financial loss. Second, given the great
number of variables involved, it is impossible for an attorney to make
an accurate prediction of how well the settlor's heirs will be served by
such a trust many years later when the trust is accessed. Third, given
that a court has held that the complications of the RAP are beyond
the expected capacity of the average competent lawyer,73 it is most
unlikely that courts would find that failing to master the complicated
evaluation of a dynasty trust required to predict the ability of a
dynasty trust to provide dynastic wealth constitutes malpractice.
In addition we offer an added possible consideration about the
issue of possible malpractice. By the time the dynasty trust proves that
it has not provided dynastic wealth, the settlor, who is the only one
likely to have standing to sue, and her attorney will likely not be
walking the earth and the statute of limitations will likely have expired
long ago. This, however, should not be viewed as excusing the
attorney from being professionally obligated to provide the client with
competent quality legal advice regarding the practical shortcomings of
so-called dynasty trust. In closing, although a first rate estate planner
is likely to understand the inability of a dynasty trust to deliver on the
promise of providing dynastic wealth, the inability of an attorney to
understand this fact or his failure to explain it to a client is not likely
to result in the attorney being found to have breached his obligation
to provide competent advice or to communicate to his client relevant
information, although this article may result in changing the
parameters within which such judgments are made.
The possibility that attorneys may not be expected to understand
the shortcomings of dynasty trusts and explain them to their clients is
not an altogether positive outcome. In the normal course of affairs,
better quality services can be encouraged by the market, as low
quality providers fall to the wayside, or by regulation. In the case of
the dynasty trust, the market effect would be to weed out estate
planners and other providers who promise too much. Only the most
sophisticated clients will be able to assist the market in this regard,
and, for the reasons already noted, regulation through the ethical
obligations also seems unlikely to be up to the task.
X. CONCLUSION

The so-called dynasty trust is a valuable device for minimizing the
weight of transfer taxes within wealthy families. Wealthy families will
73

Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
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find that their need to engage in estate planning extends far beyond
the dynasty trust. Normal net rates of return on investments cannot
reasonably be counted on to fund a dynasty. The impact of inflation,
rising expectations, and, in most cases, a growing pool of living
descendents will soon outstrip the ability of such a trust to provide for
descendents in the style to which they are likely to have become
accustomed. The name chosen to promote such trusts is primarily the
product of a clever marketing campaign and is not descriptive of the
results that such trusts are likely to produce in the ordinary course of
events. The relationship between an estate planner or an attorney and
his or her client, requires, however, a more informed examination of
likely outcomes.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix demonstrates the calculation of income available
to trust beneficiaries under a number of assumptions. The most
fundamental assumption is the gross rate of return on the corpus (i.),

which is itself a function of investment strategy. What follows
represents three investment strategies. It is assumed that the
investment portfolio is rebalanced yearly to maintain the same
relative mix of investments chosen at the establishment the trust.
Within each strategy the time when distribution of income commences
and number of beneficiaries are varied and a table presented
indicating actual outcomes.
In all cases, a calculation is made for the net real rate of return
(NRRR). As noted in the text, this is the gross return minus the sum
of trust costs (c), taxes (t), the rate of inflation (e), and an allowance
for rising expectations (rf). The latter two are combined and assumed
to be 5% in all iterations. The tax rate applied is essentially a
weighted average of the tax rates applied to the different types of
investments7 4 and is applied to the trust income after subtraction of
trust costs. The tax rates, therefore, are constant for each investment
strategy, although the impact varies depending on the mix of assets in
each investment strategy.75 Non-tax costs are assumed to be constant
at .75% of the income. This cost is assumed to apply both before and
after vesting. In all examples the initial trust investment is assumed to
be $3.5 million.
To avoid erosion of the spending power of the income that is to
be annually received by beneficiaries once distribution commences,
74 It is assumed that all dividend and capital income is taxed at the rate of
15%.

See I.R.C. § 1. Interest income is taxed at the rate of 35% (the rate at which most trust
retained income other than dividends and long-term capital gains would be taxed. See
supra notes 38-39. Moreover, it is assumed that in a given year one-third of all net
appreciation (after allowing for administrative costs) experienced in a given year is
taxed as long-term capital as the trust assets are managed. For example, if in a given
year a gross return of 10% is assumed with 20% of the income (or 2% of the 10%) is
realized as dividend income, then one third of the remaining 8% of trust return
deemed to have been realized as long-term capital gains is taxed at 15%. These
factors account for different tax costs in each of the three different investment
scenarios in the appendix.
75 For example, the presence of bonds in one investment strategy will call into
play the 35% tax on ordinary income that is effectively applied to retained trust
income. Whereas, if a trust holds only stocks, then the 15% tax on dividends and longterm capital gains will result in a lower effective tax rate for that strategy.
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only current NRRR is distributed to beneficiaries in each of the
investment strategies illustrated below. If this were not done and if all
income were distributed, due to factors such as inflation, rising
expectations, taxes, and other trust costs, the purchasing power of
future distributions of trust income would be gradually reduced, with
significant real negative impact soon being manifest. Allowing even
this modest distribution of a given trust's worth will have an adverse
impact on the ability of the trust to keep up with growth in the
number of new beneficiaries that are added to the pool of the settlor's
surviving descendents, their spouses and offspring as marriages, births,
and deaths impact on the pool of those who look to the trust for
support. In point of fact, unless distributions occur at an even lower
rate than the NRRR, in most circumstances, future generations are
likely to effectively experience dramatically lower benefits.
Lastly, because the NRRR makes allowance for the impact of
inflation and rising expectations, the data in the investment strategies
below can be viewed as being expressed in terms of constant dollars.76
A. Investment Strategy 1
The first investment strategy assumes equal investments in large
company stocks, small company stocks and long-term corporate
bonds. The weighted average return is 9.25%7 This produced a
weighted average tax rate of 1.03%.78 The net real rate of return is
2.47% which is calculated as follows:

76 To produce constant dollars, we adjust not only for inflation, but also for

rising expectations.
77 This is the average of the returns on these three types of investments
as
indicated on Table 1, supra note 28 and accompanying text. The rate of return
assigned to small cap companies is probably excessive based on experiences with the
Vanguard Small Cap Index fund since its founding in 1960. See supra note 28.
Consequently, the gross rate of return assigned to this investment strategy is probably
excessive. The same point is made with respect to Investment Strategy 2. See infra
note 81 and accompanying text.
78 See supra note 74. After deducting allowable costs from trust
income the net
amount was taxed on the assumption that the small cap stock paid dividends at the
rate of 1.75% of their value based on the fact that is the return on the Vanguard Small
Cap Index Mutual Fund. Similarly, the dividend rate of return on the large cap stock
was set at 2% based on Vanguard data for its S&P 500 Index Fund. The interest rate
for the bond component of the portfolio was based on the data found. Supra note 28
and accompanying text. The balance of the yield on the stock portion of the portfolio
was determined to be appreciation after subtracting the dividend yield from the data
reported by Ibbotson Associates. Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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NRRR = nominal income during trust accumulation (i.,) - (cost of
maintenance and management (c) + tax (t)79 + expectancy (e) +
inflation (r:)).

Or
2.47 = 9.25 - (.75 + 1.03 + 5.0).
Using the basic future value formula, A = PV(1 + NRRR)', the

accumulated amount at the end of fifty years is $11,855,100. 80
Assuming a 9.25% return on the trust and a NRRR of 2.47% for this
investment strategy, the amount distributed to each of twenty-five
beneficiaries is $11,713 per year. More specifically, each cell illustrates
the distribution in real income, and thus the impact for future
generations should be the same as it would be for current recipients as
long as the number of beneficiaries remains constant. If the number
were to increase in future years, then the distribution amount would
decline. Similarly, if, in future years, the number of living beneficiaries
decreases, then the distribution amount would increase in future
years.
These results plus those for the sixty and seventy year retention
periods before distributions commence and varying numbers of
beneficiaries are set out in Table Al.
Table Al: Distribution Per Beneficiary By Retention Period and'
Number of Beneficiaries-Strategy 1
BENEFICIARIES
RETENTION
PERIOD

25
50
60
1 70

11,700
15,000
19,100

30

35

9,800
12,500
15,900

8,400
10,700
13,600

CORPUS
TOTAL
50
5,900
7,500
9,500

11,855,100
15,131,200
19,312,500

B. Investment Strategy 2

Under investment strategy 2, one-half of the corpus is invested in
large company stocks and one-half in small company stocks. The

It is assumed that one-third of the appreciation occurring in each year would
be taxed as long term capital gains. The reader can vary this and any assumptions. For
example, in the case of large cap stocks in Strategy 3, it may be reasonable to assume
little, if any, capital gain income due to the buy and hold nature of index funds that
may be used as the investment vehicle for this strategy.
8D All amounts are rounded to the nearest $100.
79
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weighted gross rate of return is 11.5%.81 This produces a weighted tax

rate

Holding constant

of .65%.82

for the maintenance

and

management costs as well and inflation and expectations, produces a

NRRR of 5.1%. Under this set of assumptions and with a retention
period of 50 years the corpus would grow to $42,092,500 in constant

dollars. Assuming an 11.5% return (a NRRR of 5.1%), twenty-five
beneficiaries and distribution per beneficiary of each beneficiary's
share of the income generated by the NRRR at the end of the
retention period, the amount per person distributable would be
$85,800. These results plus those for the sixty and seventy year

retention periods and varying numbers of beneficiaries are set out in
Table A2.
Table A2: Distribution Per Beneficiary By Retention Period and
Number of Beneficiaries-Strategy 2
CORPUS
TOTAL

BENEFICIARIES
RETENTION
PERIOD

50
60

25
85,800
141,100

30
71,500
171,700

35
61,300
100,900

50
42,900
70,600

42,092,400
69,219,800

70

232,200

193,500

165,900

116,100

113,830,200

C. Investment Strategy 3
This strategy assumes that the entire corpus is invested in large
company stocks. The starting point or gross return is estimated to be
81

It is unlikely that the rate of return on small cap stocks reported by Ibbotson

since 1925 (12.6%) will be realized. See supra note 28. A more likely rate of return for
a combined large cap/small cap portfolio would be in the range of 9.47% based on the
experience with the Vanguard Small Cap Index fund since 1960. Vanguard Small-Cap
Shares,
https://personal.vanguard.com/us/funds/
Fund
Admiral
Index
snapshot?Fundld=0548&FundlntExt=INT#hist:tab= (last visited Feb. 12, 2009).
Nonetheless, to maintain consistency with our data source, we have used the higher
rate reported by Ibbotson for small cap stock investments and have used a gross rate
of return of 11.5% for such a stock portfolio. Were we to use a rate of return for small
cap stock suggested by the Vanguard data then the results under Investment Strategy
2 would be very close to the results under Investment Strategy 3 in which a gross rate
of return of 10.4% was used.
Under this strategy, no income is taxed at the 35% rate. Dividends and longterm capital gains were assumed to be taxed at 15%, which is consistent with current
law but may not hold throughout the retention period. The same assumptions about
taxes that were made in the previous investment strategy were made with respect to
this investment strategy. See supra note 74.

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 28:779

10.4%. 83 The estimated tax rate was .62%. 84 After subtracting this and
the other adjustments to gross return as describe above the NRRR
was 4.03%. At the end of the fifty year retention period the corpus
would be $25,234,700 in constant dollars. Assuming that the amount
distributed to each beneficiary would be the beneficiaries share of the
corpus times the NRRR, the amount distributed to each of the twentyfive beneficiaries at the end of the retention period would be $40,700.
These results plus those for the sixty and seventy year retention
periods and varying numbers of beneficiaries are set out in Table A3.
Table A3: Distribution Per Beneficiary By Retention Period and
Number of Beneficiaries- Strategy 3
CORPUS
TOTAL

BENEFICIARIES
RETENTION
PERIOD

50
60
1 70

25
40,700
60,400
89,600

30
33,900
50,300
74,700

35
29,000
43,100
64,000

50
20,300
30,200
44,800

25,234,700
37,461,400
55,612,200

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
The same assumptions that were made with respect to the impact of taxes in
the two prior investment strategies were made with respect to this investment
strategy. See supra notes 74, 75, 78, and 79. The same assumptions that were made
with respect to dividend yield on large company stock and capital gains realized that
was made in the first two investment strategies were also made with respect to this
investment strategy. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

